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The present study is a paper commissioned for the 2005 Human Development Report. 
It describes and evaluates the use of trade related development assistance (TRDA) in 
three sectors in Africa, namely Ghanian pineapples, Kenyan horticulture and 
Senegalese fish. Furthermore, it discusses broader lessons on TRDA included in the 
existing stock of evaluations of various donor programmes in the field of TRDA in 
Africa and globally. The study evaluates the diagnosis performed by donors and 
agencies involved in TRDA activities as well as the response to that diagnosis. 
Diagnosis is understood as the identification of the needs of TRDA and response is 
interpreted as how the diagnosis results in TRDA supply. Given the limited resources 
available for the study, issues like effectiveness and efficiency of specific TRDA efforts 
in the three case studies are not the subject of any rigorous analysis and are touched 
upon only in passing. 
 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides a short overview of the 
general problems associated with TRDA. African supply capacity problems is the 
central focus of the paper, so an overview of these are given in section 3. Section 4 
contains the case studies. For each case study, the development of the industry under 
scrutiny is sketched out and the main TRDA activities are described. Finally, section 5 
draws the conclusions on the role that TRDA have played in the three cases in 
particular and the role it can and should play in Africa in general. 
  
2. A short overview of the problems associated with TRDA 
 
The Uruguay Round marked a turn-around for the participation of developing 
countries. While the overall participation was low if compared with their numbers or 
weight of the world’s population it was at a historically high level. The increased 
participation was soon to be followed by increased concern and policy analysis of 
developing countries’ potential to gain from increased market openings offered by the 
Uruguay Round. A consensus soon emerged that while in theory WTO sponsered 
liberalisation would offer benefits to developing countries, many of them would in 
practice face great difficulties in exploiting them. At the political level, the response 
soon emerged with the branding of a new type of development assistance, known as   2
Trade-Related Development Assistance (TRDA)
1. During the later half of the 1990s, 
TRDA quickly filtered into individual donor countries’ assistance programmes, and 
international organisations tuned in at the new demand, both by joining forces, most 
notably by creating the Integrated Framework (IF) in 1997 and the Joint Integrated 
Technical Assistance Programme  (JITAP) in 1998, and by designing individual 
assistance programmes as well. By now virtually all national donor agencies are 
involved in TRDA as are the major multilateral ones having trade as a part of their 
working programmes, including the World Bank, the IMF, UNCTAD, FAO, OECD, 
UNIDO, UNDP, and the WTO itself. 
 
While often presented as an innovation of the Uruguay Round, TRDA is building on 
the history of private sector donor assistance since the 1960s as well as on the 
experiences of the era of structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s. There are two 
main concerns. The first addressed trade policy. Here the aim is institutional capacity 
building targetting the capacity to negotiate and implement trade agreements. The 
second targets trade development and has to do with supply side constraints. The 
statistical recording of development aid according to these two purposes is new but is 




In 2001 and 2002, donors committed a yearly average of US$ 719 million to cover 
trade policy activities, and a further yearly average of US$ 1,408 million to activities in 
trade development (WTO/OECD 2003). Put together these figures amounted to 4.8% of 
total aid commitments, which is roughtly equivalent to the share going to population 
programmes and more than what is allocated to basic education or basic health. Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) took around 20% of the commitments in trade policy and 
regulations and 30% of trade development activities
4. 
 
In their monitoring of TRDA, DAC acknowlegdes the difficulties of clearly defining 
what consitute assistance to trade and what does not. This is most problematic 
regarding assistance to infrastructure necessary to trade, like transport, storage, 
communications and energy, which in 2001 and 2002 was responsible for 20% of total 
                                                 
1 Not surprisingly, there is not complete agreement of how to label this. Other terms used include trade-
related technical assistance (TRTA) or trade-related capacity-building (TRCB). The OECD combines the 
latter two into TRTA/CB in their aid statistics. 
2 DAC defines two types of TRDA: Trade policy and regulations  covers support to aid recipients’ 
effective participation in multilateral trade negotiations, analysis and implementation of multilateral trade 
agreements, trade policy mainstreaming and technical standards, trade facilitation including tariff 
structures and customs regimes, support to regional trade arrangements and human resources 
development in trade. Trade development covers business development and activities aimed at improving 
the business climate, access to trade finance, and trade promotion in the productive sectors (agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, industry, mining, tourism, services), including at the institutional and enterprise level. 
3 The work of the DAC in monitoring and assessing TRDA is documented at 
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34665_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. A database has been built 
collecting for now 39 national and international donors’ information on their activities in this field and 
may be accessed at http://tcbdb.wto.org. The OECD and the WTO has issued two joint reports on TRDA, 
the first one published in November/December 2002 may be accessed at 
http://tcbdb.wto.org/publish/dbreport_e.pdf while the second published July 2003 can be found at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/4/11422694.pdf. 
4 This should be compared to LDCs share of total aid of around 30% (WTO/OECD 2003).   3
aid commitments equivalent to a yearly average of US$ 8.1 billion. Such support is not 
counted as TRDA although a part of it is clearly supportive of trade. 
 
Prior to the Uruguay Round, donor assistance to trade was common although less high-
profile and not put under one common heading as with todays TRDA. Earlier assistance 
included assistance to export marketing and to trade facilitation undertaken since the 
1960s and to trade liberalisation notably undertaking since the introduction of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in the early 1980s. Such activities would mostly fall 
under what is viewed today as trade development. The novelty of TRDA since the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round is lying in its inclusion of activities in the trade 
policy category as well as in the increased volume of total assistance. Furthermore, two 
high profile multilateral initiatives have been created, namely the IF and JITAP. The 
latter development is innovative in its attempt to use a common analytical framework 
and to coordinate the activities and approaches of international agencies. Lately, there 
has also been serious attempts to integrate TRDA with other development activities 
notably within the framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) led by 
the World Bank. This latter development is often dubbed as ‘mainstreaming’ trade. 
From a political perspective, the novelty consists of the clear link with mulilateral trade 
negotiations as well as the general high profile of TRDA. 
 
To date, a number of reviews exists of TRDA activites (ADE 2004; Bonaglia and 
Fukasaku 2002; De Silva and Weston 2002; Luke 2002; OECD 1997, 2003, Prowse 
2002; Solignac Lecomte 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003; UNCTAD 2002; Van Hove and 
Solignac Lecomte 1999; WTO 2000, 2003a; WTO/OECD 2002, 2003). The reviews 
point out a number of problematic issues with TRDA which will be discussed shortly 
below. 
 
 The balance between trade policy and trade development activities 
While trade development is as old an objective for aid as aid itself, aid for trade policy 
purposes is new. The much focus on institutional WTO-related issues like the capacity 
to participate in negotiations and the design of trade policies in developing countries 
risk to divert attention from the other part of the coin, trade development. An example 
of this is the JITAP which has been critisied notably in its early days (pre-2000) to 
focus exclusively on trade policy Luke (2002). The problem of balance is particularly 
acute for African countries. Simulations of the effects of the Uruguay Round and of the 
Doha Round to be concludes show that African countries may fare much worse than the 
average developing countries (Bouet et al. 2004). This should lead to caution about the 
potential positive effects of trade policy activities as most of Africa’s problems is not 
about negotiating and implementing the right set of rules. Africa’s problem is mainly 
on the supply side (Bonaglia and Fukasaku 2002) where trade development is needed. 
 
 Lack of coordination 
The Integrated Framework was born at a High-Level Meeting in Geneva in October 
1997. It goes without saying that TRDA was conceived as being an integrated effort to 
help LDCs and other countries benefit from the global trading system. Coordination 
between donors and international agencies has nevertheless been very difficult. Both 
the IF and JITAP had to be revamped a few years after the beginning due to the lack of 
coordiation among other things (WTO 2000, 2003a; De Silva and Weston 2002).   4
 The risk of biased aid 
TRDA is different from other types of aid. A donor offers assistance based on his 
development objectives, while a trade negotiator offers concession based on his 
commercial motives. When we discuss TRDA the donor and the trade negotiator are 
identical which may lead to problems of identifying which side of the negotiation table 
the TRDA donor is on (Solignac Lecomte 2001, 2003). 
  
 The use of TRDA in trade negotiations 
In contrast to other types of aid, TRDA is actively used in political negotiations, e.g. 
trade negotiations. Despite the much hype about the development orientation of the so-
called Doha Development Round it is quite difficult to offer meaningful trade 
concessions to a number of developing countries, mostly LDCs and African countries. 
TRDA is often presented as an alternative to meaningful trade concessions. This puts 
great pressure on providing TRDA and may lead to neglect of the issue of the quality of 
the TRDA provided. Furthermore, the use of TRDA as a political argument creates a 
new logic of trade negotiations. In the past, any successful trade agreement had to be 
based on than horse trading leading to the sharing of benefits, but when TRDA on the 
negotiation table, it is possible to see all benefits go to one side with a promise then of 
TRDA to the losing side. TRDA is then supposed to play a role of making benefits 
possible by trade development or to compensate the loosers. 
 
 Absorption capacity 
While TRDA is innovative in some aspects in others if suffers from the same problems 
as does traditional development assistance. One of these is the absorption capacity of 
recipients. There is reason to believe that this problem may be acute for TRDA. Trade 
policy activities are risking to overburden weak administration struggling to deal with a 
large number of issues including non-trade related ones which may be wrongly put off 
side. Regarding trade development, the number of actors that may be potentially 
targetted is most often greater, nevertheless experience tell us that absorption capacity 
of African industries is often low. 
 
3. A short overview of African supply capacity problems 
 
Africa struggles with two separate types of capacity problems as emhasised above. 
First, the capacity to design trade policy both internationally and domestically. Second, 
the capacity to trade. This section deals with the latter. 
 
A successful completion of the Doha Round may give increased export incentives to 
African farmers. This is not the first time this has happened. Rather it is best seen as 
one step on the trail towards market-based economies that Africa has followed since the 
early 1980s. The onset of Structural Adjustment Programmes market the beginning of 
domestic liberalisation, while the Uruguay Round lay the groundrules for the global 
liberalisation that will have to be completed by the Doha Round. Both types of 
liberalisation promises better prices and increased market access to farmers in Africa. It 
is therefore reasonable to take a look at how African farmers responded to similar 
incentives offered earlier in the liberalisation process. Unfortunately, learning from 
history should leave a few raised eyebrows. 
   5
The supply response has been slow and limited. It has become common wisdom to talk 
about ‘supply-side constraints’ and it is not difficult to find examples of these in the 
literature (e.g. Kydd and Dorward 2003). Below a non-exhaustive list of the most 
important ones is present and the individual constraints discussed briefly. 
 
 Poorly developed  rural institutions 
The continent-wide liberalisation of agricultural supply chains
5 increased the demand 
for rural institutions to provide inputs and credit, to link farmers with markets, to assure 
economic coordination and to reduce transaction costs. It is therefore not surprising that 
the supply response has been low (Dorward and Kydd 2003). One example is the 
liberalisation of the cotton sector (Poulton et al. 2004). The withdravel of the state led 
to more competition in cotton industries but greater competition is not always linked to 
better performance. Liberalised cotton industries have often failed to develop systems 
for maintaining cotton quality and for providing inputs and credit. This has harmed 
performance especially in industries with many small players. 
 
 Low level of investment in physical infrastructure and social services 
Exports in general and export agriculture in particular is dependent on physical 
infrastructure. In many African countries, the access to market is limited by poor feeder 
roads and access to international market is furthermore complicated by poorly 
functioning ports and airports. But the problems doesn’t stop with transport 
infrastructure. Communication and storage facilities are often deficient and agriculture 
is held back by the lack of irrigation facilities (Amani 2004). Social services targetting 
improved education and health levels are part of the social infrastructure. Most of 
Africa’s farmers remain semi-literate at best. The capacity to participate in modern food 
trade require both an ability to keep records at the farm level and to keep the costs of 
complying with sanitary standards low. The latter depend partly on the initial level of 
basic sanitation and hygiene. 
 
 Agrarian structure 
African agriculture is heavily dominated by traditional smallholder farming. 
Furthermore, traditions of land ownership often prevents rapid structural change. The 
existence of many tiny and widely scattered smallholder amplifies the problems of rural 
institutions and of the lack of physical infrastructure. Recent developments in sectors 
like horticulture has demonstrated that the agrarian structure may constitute a 
comparative disadvantage of African agriculture in international trade (Jensen 2004; 
Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Barrett et al. 1999). 
 
 Domination of political system by vested interests 
African governments are notoriously weak and susceptible to pressure from interest 
groups. This leads to a poor economic policy environment. Part of the problem is the 
                                                 
5 One should interprete the concept of ‘liberalisation’ with caution here. The concept normally implies an 
intentional process of withdrawel of the state involving real choices of alternative policies. In many 
African countries, the liberalisation process was not much of a designed process rather it was an ad hoc 
response to rapidly detoriating economic conditions and when donors refused to support alternative 
developments the choices available quickly narrowed down to one: Liberalisation. In many supply 
chains, when the marketing boards went bankrupt, the chain were in essence ‘liberalised’. In some cases, 
it is appropriate to look upon the liberalisation process as an example of ‘liberalisation by default’.   6
heritage of many African political systems that developed on a background of 
colonialism and often adhering to socialist principles. In many countries there was 
strong suspicion of the private sector and its links with colonial interests. There was a 
strong belief in the need and capacity of the state to intervene to secure development 
objectives. This lead to a neglect of the potential of the private sector including 
smallholder agriculture and the promotion of large-scale agriculture. The design of 
large-scale public intervention was in practice an open door to vested interest that lead 
to the derailing of public efforts to achieve development. The first decades after 
independence failed to produce an effective government sector. Marketing boards and 
similar institutions in many instances provided inputs and credit (often not recovered) 
to farmers most often backed by donors. These institutions were more often than not 
highly inefficient and failed to develop into sustainable solutions to the farmers’ 
problems of linking up with the world economy. 
 
 Lack of public capacity to regulate and provide services 
African export development in agriculture has been focused on bulk export 
commodities for which public intervention was not crucial. Unfortunately, this also lead 
to a highly concentrated export structure and subsequently a strong need for export 
diversification. Diversification will have to take into place into products for which the 
demand for effective public regulation and service provision is higher (Jensen 2004). 
Fish exports to the EU is plain impossible without a minimum level of public oversight 
capacity to enforce food safety standards. This is likely to put African countries in a 
disadvantaged position vis-à-vis other developing countries such as middle income 
countries in Asia and Latin America. 
 
 Lack of technology to transform traditional agriculture 
There is a potential for increasing smallholder income through new technology. But 
then smallholder farmers would have to have access to new technology at prices they 
can pay with the increased productivity. Farmers must also have access to inputs and to 
output markets. Funding for research and development focusing on problems faced by 
the African farmer is small. New technology is basically transferred to farmers through 
extension and advisory services which have been cut back in Africa. 
 
 Widespread corruption 
Corruption is part of the problem when discussing the ineffectiveness of the public 
sector. Corruption is not constrained to the public sector but may also be part of the 
everyday live of private companies. Corruption hinders the capacity to trade at low 
costs. Corruption introduces ‘user fees’ for a large spectrum of services thereby 
increasing costs above marginal production costs. Furthermore, corruption creates 
distorted incentives towards inefficiency. 
 
There are two things to emphasise about African supply side constraints. First, while 
the deluge of structural adjustment was based on the belief that capacity problems was 
mainly a public sector phenomenon, the lesson of the last two decades have been the 
rather depressing one that the private sectors suffers too. Second, the depth of the 
constraints, that is the degree to which problems are structural and therefore likely to 
change only slowly, varies across the different problems. The latter characteristic has   7
important implications for the opportunities of TRDA to play a capacity building role 
and the speed with which capacity may be build. 
 
4. Case studies: Kenyan horticulture, Ghanian pineapple and Senegalese fish 
 
The case studies review the past development of the export industries under scrutiny as 
well as the major constraints to increased exports. Subsequently, TRDA activities are 
analysed. The identification of TRDA activities is an issue in itself. There are several 
definitions of what TRDA actually is and the most accepted one, the one provided by 
the OECD in their statistical recording, is new. Many past interventions were designed 
or implemented in the period preceeding the introduction of formal definitions 
(basically before 2000). The TRDA activities discussed here have therefore been 
selected on the basis of having the potential to impact trade in the given sector 
significantly. The case study approach yields a clear bias in the analysis. TRDA 
activites within the OECD category of ‘trade development’ (as opposed to ‘trade policy 
and regulation’) is favoured. This is because support for the negotiation and 
implementation of trade agreements has a broad rather than sector-specific impact and 
such support is unlikely to have yielded any effects as of today. Support for trade rules 
is rather new and has only been provided any major scale since around 2000. 
 
4.1 A case study of horticulture in Kenya 
 
4.1.1 Development of the industry 
 
Kenya is a country where the production of fresh fruit and vegetables for export has 
been in constant development since the late 1950s. Production has mainly evolved 
without the support of the state and some analysts have even cited this fact as a key 
component of the Kenyan success story in fresh fruit and vegetables (Jaffee 1995). 
Today, Kenya exports about 110 different fresh fruit and vegetables. There is also a 
thriving export of cut flowers. Only a handful of products dominates. The fruits 
avocados, mangoes, passion fruit and pineapple and the vegetables green beans, snow 
and snap peas as well as a group of tropical vegetables destined for ethnic markets in 
Western Europe commonly known as Asian vegetables account for three quarters of 
exports by volume. The remaining products are mostly a vast range of different 
vegetables. The growth of the industry was slow in the 1960s but exploded during the 
1970s. In 1975, the exports of fruits and vegetables including a few processed products 
passed 10,000 tons and this volume was six times as high by 1999. A vibrant cut flower 
industry developed alongside the fresh produce exports as can be seen from figure 1. 
 
Most of the Kenyan exports goes to the UK, Holland, France and Germany with UK 
being by far the biggest market for vegetables. This is demonstrated in table 1. For 
fruits, the picture is more complex with passion fruit mainly going to the UK, avocado 
mainly going to Holland and France and mango going almost totally to the Middle East. 
The concentration of products in a very small number of markets imply that the 
developments in these markets become crucial. In Europe in general and in the UK in 
particular, large supermarket chains play a dominant role in the retail of fresh produce. 
In the UK, the supermarkets now sell around 70% of fresh produce while the remaining  
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Figure 1. Kenyan horticultural exports, 1970-1999 (tons) 
 
Note: The figure covers both tropical nuts and fresh and processed horticultural products. Not all 
processed products are included though and tropical nuts are of negligible importance until the late 




30% is channelled through wholesale markets (Barrett et al. 1999). In general, the 
supermarkets have a similar share of trade in Northern Europe while they are much less 
dominant in Southern Europe where much fresh produce is still sold on traditional 
markets and through independent greengroceries. France is somewhere in the middle. 
Everywhere, though, supermarkets are gaining market shares. 
 
The industry is organised around two sets of actors, the producers and the exporters. 
The concentration of exporters in Kenyan horticulture is quite low compared to other 
horticultural industries. There is about 400 exporters active, although no more than half 
of these are active at the same time. About half the exporters can be said to be so-called 
'briefcase exporters', that is part-time exporters who go in and out of the market 
according to the market situation, therefore only being present at market peaks such as 
Mother's Day and Christmas for flowers and the European winter months for temperate 
vegetables. These exporters have no structures in place in the sense that they do not 
have farms on their own, nor do they have permanent trading structures like lorries and 
coldstores, but rent transport vehicles and space in coldstores when they come about 
produce. While the number of these exporters is large, the amount they export is very 
small, somewhere between 2-10%. About 90% of exports is done by constant year-
round exporters. Most of these have their own farms and supplement the export volume 
by buying from other farmers either large or small-scale commercial farmers or 


































































































































Total Fruit and vegetables Flowers  9
Table 1. Markets for Kenyan fresh horticultural exports (percent of exported volume) 
 






Africa  Total 
Total fresh horticulture  35  33  10  7  3  7  5  100 
Cut flowers  16  65  1  9  3  4  1  100 
Green beans  56  0  29  3  3  0  10  100 
Snow and snap peas  73  9  5  7  3  0  3  100 
Asian vegetables  66  1  4  12  1  0  16  100 
Avocado  1  46  32  9  2  7  3  100 
Mango  4  1  1  1  1  92  1  100 
Passion fruit  49  18  16  6  9  1  0  100 
Note: The figures for the rest of Europe covers Belgium, Sweden, Italy and Switzerland. The figures for 





The government continued the policy of no interference after independence although a 
Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) was set up in 1967. In contrast to 
government policy for most other export crops, the HCDA was provided with only a 
vague set of powers and was primarily acting as the sector's overall regulatory body. 
Research and extension activities were rare and by 1979 only 15-20 horticultural 
advisers were available serving mainly large commercial farmers. The HCDA and other 
government officials often voiced concerns over bottleneck problems in the crucial area 
of airfreight but often government initiatives did more to worsen this problem than to 
solve it. Some government initiatives did have a lasting impact on the sector like the 
establishment of a avocado seedling propagation project undertaken at the National 
Horticultural Research Station in the late 1970s which effectively although contrary to 
the initial intentions created the base of later exports of avocado. Nevertheless the 
development of fresh horticultural exports has been and is by and large the exclusive 
domain of private entrepreneurs. 
 
The Kenyan horticultural sector appear strong and still growing today but nevertheless 
face a series of challenges. The most commonly discussed one is the introduction of 
strict food safety standards in key European markets (Barrett et al. 1999; Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000; Jaffee 2003; Jensen 2004) but other challenges such as increased 
competition from newcomers to the fresh produce trade, poor infrastructure, and 
relatively high airfreight charges continue to trouble the sector. 
 
Before the 1990s there were only few and insignificant food safety requirements that 
the Kenyan fresh produce sector had to respect in order to secure market access. Such 
food safety requirements included EU maximum pesticide residue legislation but 
compliance was easy and Kenyan exports were affected very rarely by such rules. Since 
then four major factors have either already changed the demands put forward to Kenyan 
fresh fruit and vegetables or are likely to do so in the near future. These factors are (1) 
the entry into force of the Food Safety Act in the United Kingdom in 1991, (2) the 
increasing role played by private quality assurance standards in the procurement 
strategies by European especially British supermarkets, (3) the harmonisation program 
of pesticide legislation in the EU and (4) finally the reform of EU food safety policies   10
undertaken as a response to the outbreak of a series of major food safety crises in the 
EU during the 1990s. 
 
In 1990 the United Kingdom adopted a new piece of food safety legislation entitled the 
Food Safety Act which involved a considerable change in British food safety policy and 
the legislation came into force on 1 January 1991. The Food Safety Act is a general 
food law which among other things changed the legal responsibility that a food trader 
has in the event of a food safety crisis. It was required that a food producer or trader 
exercised "due diligence" in the production and handling of food (Hobbs and Kerr 
1992). The due diligence requirement means that a food trader must be able to 
demonstrate that he has been proactive in ensuring that not only the food they handle 
directly but also the food they receive from suppliers conform to the provisions of the 
Food Safety Act. A food importing company must know where and how the products 
handled have been produced and handled and have the necessary documentation to 
prove it. This includes setting up monitoring schemes of how the company itself 
handles food as well as how the food has been handled and produced by upstream 
companies. Under the new law, traders may be held accountable for food safety 
problems in products under their control even if the problem was not introduced by 
them but by some upstream agent such as the farmer or the exporter. The due diligence 
requirements made the food law of the UK the most demanding in Europe regarding the 
information flow that had to accompany the flow of products. The large demands on 
monitoring and documentation have translated into a general requirement for 
traceability in the production and trade of fresh fruit and vegetables for export in 
Kenya. An exporter must know the location of production as well as the conditions 
under which the product has been produced and traded. 
 
Simultaneously, the EU has been tightening its pesticide policy. It has introduced new 
and lower maximum residue levels (MRLs) and in some cases has even banned some 
chemicals completely. Furthermore, private standards have grown in importance as 
supermarkets have increased their strength in EU retail markets, notably in the UK 
which is the main market for Kenya. UK supermarkets have their own codes of conduct 
including rules on traceability, food hygiene and pesticide residues which they inform 
by visiting Kenyan farms 2-4 times a year (Jaffee 2003; Jensen 2004). Continental 
supermarkets are less stringent on food safety but everybody in the industry expect this 
to change in the near future (Jensen 2004). 
 
The result of the increased importance of food safety markets have been a process of 
marginalisation of smallholders in key markets (Barrett et al. 1999; Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000; Jaffee 2003; Jensen 2004). Dolan and Humphrey 2000 estimated that 
the sourcing from smallholders of four major exporters that cater to UK supermarkets 
went down from 18 percent in 1998 to 11 percent in 2001. The smallholders that do 
cling on succeed due to their incorporation into strongly coordinated contract schemes 
with large exporters. The exporters carefully pick the more resourceful smaller growers 
(often small-scale commercial farmers) to avoid problems of granting inputs on credit. 
This is a radical change in the industry since the 1980s were green beans were procured 
through open markets which allowed traditional smallholders to participate. Today 
these farmers are gone from the growing supermarket trade. 
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The industry as such continues to grow and there is an important debate about the 
importance for Kenya of the decline of smallholder participation. Recent papers from 
Humphrey, McCulloch, and Ota (2004) and McCulloch and Ota (2002) claim that 
despite the obvious loss to smallholders since the early 1990s, it is not unlikely that the 
country as such has gained as the losses to smallholders have been compensated by 
industry-wide growth in general and employment creation in large farms and 
processing facilities in particular. 
 
A long time observer and analyst of Kenyan horticulture, senior economist Steven 
Jaffee from the World Bank even believes that the appearance of food safety 
requirements on the market has saved the Kenyan industry from strong competitive 
pressure from newcomers on the world market for fresh produce. In a recent paper, 
Steven Jaffee concludes: 
 
“Kenya’s historical source of comparative advantage has been its capacity to 
produce high-quality produce on a year-round basis. Its main competitors had more 
seasonally restricted supply patterns and/or were not providing a product with 
consistent quality. A range of competitors have recently closed the seasonality 
advantage and there is a perception in the market that some competitors have come 
to match or even exceed Kenyan quality for several products. Nevertheless, the 
Kenyan industry continues to adjust and to grow. It is somewhat ironic that a 
relatively low income and low wage country such as Kenya now finds its competitive 
advantage in the most sophisticated segments of the European fresh vegetable 
market. Kenya’s trade is increasingly gravitating precisely to those segments in the 
market that are most demanding in terms of SPS and other standards. Its future 
growth will depend upon its ability to maintain those standards, the pace of growth in 
this market segment within the UK and the extent to which demand for value-added 
and, indeed, ‘high-care’ chilled vegetable consumer products can be fostered in other 
European markets. 
 
Rather than posing an imminent threat to the maintenance of Kenya’s fresh vegetable 
trade, the ratcheting up of standards—led by private sector approaches among 
European firms—has actually provided a lifeline to the Kenyan industry at a time of 
increased competition and relatively flat demand for the earlier generation of 
specialty vegetables for which Kenya was one of the leading suppliers. Several of 
Kenya’s main competitors seem, in recent years, to have scaled the logistical and 
quality control barriers to become reliable suppliers of specialty vegetables. Yet, 
elements of the Kenyan industry have moved to the next phase of business 
development—one that entails seemingly significant financial and technical barriers 
to entry” (Jaffee 2003, pp. 33-34). 
 
4.1.2 TRDA activities 
 
 The Horticultural Produce Handling Facilities project 
By far the most ambitious TRDA undertaken in Kenyan horticulture ever is a project 
sponsored by the Japan Bank for International Coorperation (JBIC) entitled “the 
Horticultural Produce Handling Facilities project”. The project aimed at establishing 
seven local satellite depots located in the main growing areas and linked to a large 
auction house facility in Nairobi managed by the HCDA. The original idea was that the   12
HCDA should source supply from smallholders organised in farmers’ groups, process 
the produce at the satellite depots and auction it off to exporters in the aution in 
Nairobi. The project has failed dramatically. The whole approach soon showed to be 
infeasible reportingly due to the requirements of the major companies for assured and 
traceable supplies. In October 2002, the facility was handling some 30 tons per week 
compared with an estimated break-even of 289 tons per week (Jaffee 2003)
6. The 
project appears to have targetted traditional marketing problems of physical 
infrastructure such as cooling facilities and warehouse facilities much more heavily 
than more recent and more important challinges such as traceability and pesticide use. 
All in all, the project appear to have failed mainly due to lack of knowledge of the main 
challenges facing the smallholders in particular and Kenyan horticulture in general 
coupled with poor planning. 
 
The role of the HCDA in the project was also unclear. No doubt, the implementation of 
the project led to the resurrection of the agency that was otherwise suffering from 
financial difficulties. The project is a bit of an anomaly in African export agriculture. A 
decade and a half of structural adjustment programmes and liberalisation has made 
most marketing boards and similar institutions of heavy government involvement 
vanish on the continent. Nevertheless, the JBIC project tightened the grib of the HCDA 
on the horticultural industry. In effect, the project attempted to make the HCDA a key 
player in domestic marketing actively involved in crop procurement, and stopping short 
only of doing exporting itself. A consultancy report wonders at the fact that: “this 
would have been an appropriate programme 20 years ago to stimulate production and 
assists the exporters access higher quality material, its purpose is less clear at present 
as privately owned cold rooms and those owned by the airlines and shipping agents are 
already in place” (ECI 2001, p. 14). 
 
A proposed new Horticultural Bill appears to go in the same direction. The formulation 
of the new Horticultural Bill was supported by USAID (Opondo undated). The Bill 
seeks to expand the role of the HCDA to include among other things a much broader 
responsibility for the welfare of the smallholder farming. Finance of HCDA is proposed 
to consist of a one percent levy on horticultural turnover. The Bill was opposed 
succesfully by the well-organised Kenyan horticultural export industry and is unlikely 
to become adopted in the future. 
 
Overall, it should be stated that the JBIC funded project has been so special in the 
current African context in both its objectives and design that it provides only limited 




                                                 
6 The project has suffered from very severe deficiencies in planning. While I was doing fieldwork on the 
Kenyan horticultural sector in September-November 2000, I was initially unaware of this project which 
appeared to be a secret in the industry despite the fact that it was going to be operational only six months 
later. While I was informed about the project during a visit to the HCDA, I failed to meet any exporter 
who was aware of the project. Nevertheless, the project was designed to rely on exporters to buy the 
produce at the central auction. Project documents reveal that few if any of the major exporters were ever 
involved in the design of the project.   13
 FPEAK 
The Fresh Produce Exporters Association (FPEAK) is the main association 
representing fruit and vegetable exporters. Historically, it has mainly served the 
interests of small and medium-sized exporters, while the largest have either preferred to 
lobby on their own or worked their influence through the Kenyan Flower Council as 
most of the largest exporters produce flowers too. The new HCDA/JBIC project and the 
proposed new horticultural law has however made large exporters interested in joining 
too (ECI 2001). FPEAK’s main source of finance has until recently been USAID. It has 
undertaken both traditional industry coordination functions as well as provided 
extension services and run traditional development projects mainly focused on linking 
smallholders to exporters by establishing farmers’ groups. The support to farmers’ 
groups have consistent in solving their input and credit problems and more recently to 
assure compliance with MRLs and secure traceability. While the assistance to 
smallholders and exporters are generally viewed favourably, the organisation itself has 
failed to develop in a sustainable way (ECI 2001). As funding from USAID has 
disappeared and FPEAK is limited to seek finance from a small cess of five cents per 
kg exported, the future of the organisation is very uncertain. 
 
 Pesticide Initiative Programme  
The Pesticide Initiative Programme (PIP) was launched in 2001 under the auspices of 
the COLEACP, an EU funded organisation that promotes horticultural trade from ACP 
countries
7. One component of PIP, the ‘Good Company Practices’ component, involves the 
provision of assistance to individual companies within a number of ACP countries in order 
to design or improve food safety control and risk management systems and to provide 
technical assistance and training to company staff and smallholder outgrowers. The 
initiative is demand-driven with sub-projects being negotiated with individual export 
companies with the support tailored to the specific conditions, goals, and capacities of each 
company. 
 
In Kenya, PIP was working with eleven companies in 2002, with six sub-projects currently 
being set up and the remaining five at an earlier stage of design. Most of Kenya’s larger 
exporters have applied for support under the program and so have several smaller 
companies. The sub-projects are funded through a cost-sharing arrangement. For sub-
projects with relatively large companies, PIP will cover up to 50 percent of the estimated 
costs, typically to finance consultants to provide training or assistance in management 
systems design. For smaller companies, PIP might finance upwards of 70 percent of the 
estimated sub-project costs. Most projects will be implemented over a two or three year 
period. In Kenya, individual projects - taking account both of the PIP contribution and the 
resource and staff time contributions of the companies themselves, generally range in size 
from range from $40,000 to over $300,000. For some companies, the sub-projects focus 
predominantly upon (smallholder) farmer training and the (re-)design of systems for 
traceability. For others, the sub-projects also include capability building and other measures 
to strengthen food safety management at the packhouse level and the broader supply chain. 
This all depends on the current status of company operations. Implementation is just getting 
under way. While it is too soon to predict the outcomes, the types of sub-projects being 
designed would appear to be an excellent opportunity for exporters to maintain or even 
expand the scope of their smallholder procurement arrangements and to be in a position to 
                                                 
7 COLEACP is an acronym for the ‘Europe-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Liaison Committee’. For more 
information on this organisation, see www.coleacp.org.   14
utilize this produce in all of their market sales, including to the most demanding clients 
(Jaffee 2003). 
 
 The Rural Enterprise Agri-Business Promotion Project 
The Rural Enterprise Agri-Business Promotion Project (REAP) was initiated in early 
2000 by the NGO ‘Care’. It is supported by a number of donors including IFAD, CIDA 
and Care USA. The project evolved from a joint agribusiness project proposal 
developed by Care Kenya in collaboration with, among others, FPEAK, HCDA and 
USAID who are all key players in the sector.  
 
The project is implemented in an area South-East of Nairobi known as greater Kibwezi. 
The area produces 30% of Asian vegetables. Horticultural production is carried out in 
clusters of smallholder farmers concentrated along rivers in the area. REAP labels itself 
as a ‘Business oriented model’. It organise smallholders into groups. The first two 
farmers’ groups in the REAP project were groups that emaneted from a small growers 
scheme that was run by FPEAK and USAID. Members are preferably full time farmers 
with 1.5 acres of land or less. The groups are linked up with exporters as well as input 
and credit suppliers and provide extension services. The farmers’ groups consists of 30-
50 members growing mainly Asian vegetables for export. The farms are run by a farm 
manager who is employed by the farmers and reports to a board of farmers working 
initially under the advice of REAP. 
 
 The Horticulture Development Centre 
 
The Horticulture Development Centre (HDC) is a USAID-funded programme managed 
by the agribusiness firm Fintrac Inc. The programme was established in October 2003 
and is planned to run for a four-year period. The objective is to increase smallholders 
incomes through crop diversification, improvements in production and postharvest 
technologies and market linkages. The project currently targets smallholder production 
for both the export and the local market of passion fruit, vanilla, spices, flowers, fruit 
and local market vegetables. It also trains smallholders in various standards such as 
limits on pesticide residues and the private standard EUREPGAP
8. 
 
The EUREPGAP standard is an invention of UK and Dutch supermarkets. It has 
become very important in Kenya due to the dependence on the UK market. The HDC 
states that it will provide training for 5,000 growers organised in 50 associations. Ten 
association will be EUREPGAP certified. Recent estimation by the HDC reveils that 
that the cost to certify the average smallholder groups of 45 growers will be at least $ 
20,000. This means that the cost to the industry of certifying 50,000 smallholders 
would be no less than $ 20 million. Work is currently in coorperation with three major 






                                                 
8 For more information on EUREPGAP than provided here, see www.eurep.org.   15
 
4.2 A case study of pineapple in Ghana 
 
4.2.1 Development of the industry 
 
Pineapples are generally seen as a plantation crop suitable for mechanisation and 
industrialised organisation of production (Jaffee 1995, 1994). In Ghana this is not so. 
The Ghanian pineapple industry is partly based on smallholders who are responsible for 
about 45 percent of exports. The typical size of the land holding of these smallholders 
is 1 to 10 acreas (Trienekens 2003). Yet the industry has developed into a success since 
the 1980s that provides valuable lessons on the opportunities and constraints faced by 
African smallholders in new export markets. 
 
The industry started back in the 1980s with minor export volumes until the early 1990s 
where the 10,000 tons per year mark was passed. The industry continued to grow 
constantly as witnessed in figure 2 and today exports approach 50,000 tons and shows 
no sign of stopping. Yearly growth since the early 1990s has been in the region of 15 to 
20 percent. It ought to be noted that the temporary decrease in 1998-1999 was due to 
drought. The main market is the EU, in which Ghana is the third largest exporter of 
fresh pineapples holding about 10 percent of the market and trailing Côte d’Ivoire and 
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The base of the industry is vertically integrated companies that both own farms and do 
exporting while supplementing their own-production with produce procured from both 
independent large farms and smallholders (Takane 2004). According to Obeng (1994) 
Ghanian smallholders has a cost advantage over large farms presumably due to the low 
costs of family labour. She estimates that the production cost per ha for smallholders is 
22 percent less than for large farms and furthermore suggests that the yield per ha on 
smaller farms is higher than on larger ones. On the other hand, the smallholders face a 
number of difficulties regarding the accessibility of inputs and credits and access to 
marketing services and they face high risk due to market coordination problems. 
Smallholders are generally residual suppliers to exporters due to these problems and 
often face difficulties of meeting set standards for quality. Nevertheless, producing for 
export is perceived as being preferable by many smallholders. 
 
The continued development of the industry hinges on the opportunities of drawing in 
more land. This problem is widely regarded as crucial (World Bank 2001). Foreign 
investors desiring to set up pineapple plantations find it more than difficult to deal with 
the Bysantine maze of government agencies, traditional chiefs, and individuals 
involved in obtaining land. The process of getting access to land for large investors 
include lengthy delays, inflated crop damage assessments that increase fees to be paid 
by land uses, and various bribes to get things moving (World Bank 2001)
9. The 
problems of setting up plantations could theoretically be circumvented by sourcing 
from smallholders. Currently the incorporation of smallholders into the supply chain is 
constrained by inadequate institutions to secure economic coordination, quality control 
and contract enforcement as well as lack of credit. While exporters do links 
smallholders to export markets, they do so by selecting the more resourcefull among 
them, that is the ones that have the capacity to finance their operations themselves, and 
by limiting the use of them so that they only undertake a function of residual suppliers. 
Any large-scale expansion of the industry would be made much easier if either foreign 
investors were given better terms of acquiring land and/or properly organised 
smallholder schemes could be made operational through institutional development. 
Concerns could be raised of the social effects of building a large-scale pineapple 
industry on foreign-owned plantation. Nevertheless, this question should be approached 
in a pragmatic way. In Ghana today, plantations and smallholders are mutually 
depending on each other with the plantations in need of the small guys for volume and 
the smallholders in need of the big guys as they need access to marketing services. 
 
Futhermore, the state of rural infrastructure together with the quality of cold chains 
determine how far away from the existing production locations expansions could take 
place. The industry is also reported to suffer from high costs of handling pineapples at 
the airport and the port (World Bank 2001)
10. 
 
                                                 
9 The difficulties of obtaining land for foreing investors is one of the major differences between the small 
Ghanian industry and the much larger one in Côte d’Ivoire. In the latter country, land access is much 
easier (World Bank 2001). Or, more properly, was as the situation in Côte d’Ivoire has been rapidly 
detoriating since the first ever coup d’etat in December 1999 and the start of the civil war in September 
2002. 
10 In 2001, it was reported that the cost to the exporter for loading and shipping a pallet of pineapples 
from Ghana to Europe was 55 percent higher than in Côte d’Ivoire, $ 178to 183 versus $ 115 (World 
Bank 2001).   17
A relatively new issue of concern is the emergence of food safety concerns in the EU. 
The Ghanian pineapple industry has of course been affected by these concerns as has 
the Kenyan fresh produce industry descriped above. During the 1990s, food safety 
concerns increased in the EU in general and in particular for fresh produce (Barrett et 
al. 1999, Chan and King 2000, Coulter, Millns and Tallontire 2000, Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000, Jaffee 2003, Jensen 2004). This development is already presenting 
new challenges to the Ghanian pineapple industry. These challenges come in two 
forms. 
 
The EU is currently revising the maximum residue levels of pestidices and similar farm 
chemicals permitted in fresh produce (Chan and King 2000). During this process the 
MRLs for a number of commonly applied chemicals be lowered considerably for 
certain products. In Ghana, this is mainly relevant for the chemical ethephon for which 
the MRL was lowered from 2 mg/kg to 0.5 mg/kg (Pesticide News 2001). This 
chemical is used to make the pineapple ripen properly and uniformly before harvest, a 
practice known as ‘forcing’. 
 
In July 2001, immediately after the new EU regulation came into force, a shipment of 
pineapples was recorded as exceeding the new MRL. As a response the pineapple 
exporters cancelled new shipments to Europe for two weeks to allow sufficient time to 
adjust forcing practices (Boselie and Muller 2002). Field trials was done to develop 
good agricultural practices that would secure the respect of the lower MRL. The 
implementation of the new spraying practices was made easier by the fact that forcing 
in Ghana is generally done by workers of the export companies once fruit purchase 
from a particular plot has been agreed with the farmer. As the forcing decision does not 
involve the smallholder a situation of asymmetric information is avoided that normally 
give rise to high transaction costs when doubts about pesticide residues exists. Seen in 
this light, the existing forcing practice is an effective private institution of economic 
coordination that has helped reduce negative impacts of the EU’s current pesticide 
reform. No problem of ethephon use has been reported since July 2001. 
 
Private food safety standards may present as large barriers as public ones. UK 
supermarkets have been setting standards over and above regulatory requirements by 
demanding tight control of chemical application and the introduction of traceability. 
Traceability is a requirement of documentation that proves where a given product 
origines from and often also how it has been handled in the various links in the supply 
chain. Other EU supermarkets are also implementing private standards although 
typically much less stringent ones (Jaffee 2003; Jensen 2004). 
 
The introduction of traceability is particularly difficult in a smallholder-based sourcing 
system when the supply chains are long and there are hundreds if not thousands of 
individual suppliers with low skills of keeping records to monitor. So far, Ghana has 
not been met with this demand by most buyers as the market for Ghanian pineapples is 
mainly continental Europe notably Germany which has some of the lowest private 
standards in the EU. However the recent development of processing of pineapples into 
fresh cut fruit salads and similar products exported to UK high end buyers such as 
Marks and Spencer necessitates the development of traceability systems for at least part   18
of the industry. Furthermore, the trend of requiring traceability may spread to the 
continent in the future. 
 
4.2.2 TRDA activities 
 
 Farmapine Ghana Ltd. 
Farmapine is a limited liability company owned by five coorperative societies (with an 
80 percent share) and two exporters (with a 20 percent share). In 2003 a total of 167 
shareholding farmers were reported (Addo 2003). The company is in charge of buying, 
handling and exporting fresh pineapples. The original capital of the company came 
from a World Bank/IDA loan of 1.5 million US$ lend in 1999. Furthermore, one year’s 
working capital of the coorperatives and the company was provided as a loan. The 
participating coorperatives had benefitted from assistance from TechnoServe for 
several years before the formation of Farmapine.  
 
Contractual agreements are made between the company and the co-operatives regarding 
input supply and pineapple delivery. Supported by TechnoServe, Farmapine assists 
farmers in the following areas: 
 
⋅  Procurement and deliverty of all required production inputs on credit; 
⋅  provision of technical assistance in production and directives on production 
planning; 
⋅  provision of packaging material and training in grading; 
⋅  purchase of all export quality fruits at market prices, less credits provided; 
⋅  marketing and sale to overseas importers of all export quality fruits; 
⋅  provision of all logistic and administrative requirements for export of the crop. 
 
In addition to the original shareholding farmers’ coorperatives, the company has 
contracts with 300 new farmers as out growers on an individual basis. 
 
Farmapine has furthermore received technical assistance from the OIC
11 and the Ghana 
Cooperative Assistance project funded by USAID and implemented by the 
Cooperatives Program of USDA Rural Development. 
 
The Cooperative Development project coordinator provided formal training to 320 
members of the coorperatives to help in the development and implementation of 
workable business plans, cooperative basic principles and governance, and pineapple 
crown reduction to meet export requirements. 
 
A study of Farmapine has revealed that a high degree of satisfaction with the company 
by its shareholding farmers. Risks are reported to be lower and profits higher for 
farmers who are members of the five shareholding coorperatives than for other farmers 
(Yeboah undated). On the other hand, there are also reports of serious problems notably 
of management. Addo (2003) reports that Farmapine employs 80 permanent staff and 
thereby looks severely overstaffed given only 167 farmers and yearly exports of around 
                                                 
11 The Opportunities Industrialisation Center (OIC) is a Philadelphia-based nonprofit organisation. It has 
been active in Ghana since 1971.   19
6,000 tons. Furthermore there is “little vision for the future and little anticipation on 
changes and risks. Also the influence of the farmers’ co-operatives in the decision-
making process is unclear” (Addo 2003, p. 48). 
 
 Partnership for Food Industry Development – Fruits and Vegetables Project 
This project, known as PFID-F&V, is co-ordinated by the Institute of International 
Agriculture at Michigan State University and is one of a series of similar projects 
undertaken in African and Latin American countries. It is funded through a USAID 
grant for an initial period of four years and implemented by a number of agencies 
including TechnoServe, AMEX International and Care Ghana. The project has a 
website at http://www.pfid.msu.edu/countries/ghana.html. The project seeks to 
stimulate demand for pineapples through establishing a link with the Dutch 
supermarket chain Royal Ahold Inc. and works toward enhacing supply by 
incorporating small farmers into the market. 
 
These NGOs have provided support in the areas of training and dissemination of 
information and technologies to smallholder producers, small busineses and consumers. 
 
PFID-F&V provides short-term training for host country food indutstry professionals, 
either in the field, or in the US. Such training icnludes, but is not limetied to, training in 
food safety, food quality, environametal, and/or labour practices and standards. Throgh 
the MSU Instutute for Food Law and Regulation, PFID F&V facilites access to distance 
education in food law and regulation. Similarly, PFID – F&V facilites training in food 
and agricultural standards, both through MSU’s Institute for Food and Agricultural 
Standards, as well as through certain programs at USDA. 
 
 Complying with EUREPGAP standards 
There are two pineapple processors in Ghana. The largest one is the UK owned Blue 
Skies with a weekly production of about 60 MT serving mainly the UK market and 
prducing peeled and sliced product in natural juice in semi-rigid packages. Blue Skies 
complied with EUREPGAP in November 2001. Compliance was a necessity as the 
company exports fresh cut pineapple and other fruits to extraordinarily demanding 
European buyers like Marks & Spencer and Sainsbury. The success was obtained after 
a private-public partnership involving the UK NGO, the National Resources Institute 
(NRI). 
 
Blue Skies source its raw material from around 30 contract farmers ranging in size from 
smallholder (7 ha) to large-scale (245 ha). Approximately 30 percent of Blue Skies’ 
suppliers are smallholders (Boselie and van de Kop 2004). As the buyers of Blue Skies 
are unusual in Ghana being from the UK it is illuminating to study how EUREPGAP 
certification has impacted on smallholders. 
 
The impact on smallholders of EUREPGAP certification was diverse (Boselie and van 
de Kop 2004; Gogoe 2002). First, smallholders generally learn to cultivate pineapple by 
imitating nearby larger growers. They have a poor understand of the reasons behind the 
adopted production techniques and so use agro-chemicals incorrectly and disregard 
safety issues both with respect to their own safety as well as food safety. It is 
consequently a major step for the smallholders to convert to and comply with the strict   20
food safety standards laid down in the EUREPGAP codes. On-farm training and farmer 
field schools are an essential ingredient to build up their capacities. 
 
Second, many smallholders are illiterate and furthermore lack access to credit and 
information on horticultural practices. Traditionally they have only very loose 
relationships with exporters. They struggle to keep up with EUREPGAP requirements 
for record keeping and the creation of storage facilities for agro-chemicals and packing 
station with access to drinking water. 
 
Third, a study by Gogoe (2002) of 18 contract growers (small and large) linked up with 
Blue Skies does not show any significant changes in production costs as a result of the 
implementation of EUREPGAP. This masks two opposing development. The farmers 
generally save costs of agro-chemicals as they learn to apply them correctly but they 
incure higher costs of physical on-farm infrastructure like storage facilities and packing 
stations. While the 18 farmers are generally satisfied with EUREPGAP, they find that 
economies of scale rise on certified farms so they attempt to extend the size of their 
operations. One caveat of the study is that it only focuses on farm costs. The costs of 
monitoring farmers, training and testing are omitted as they are paid by Blue Skies. 
 
The experiences of the NRI and Blue Skies is that the development of a strategy to 
include smallholders in the supermarket chain, has necessitated a partnership between 
public and private stakeholders (Boselie and van de Kop 2004). The partnership has in 
this case been set up and run with the active support of a donor, NRI, and it is uncertain 
whether the inclusion of the smallholders would be sustainable without donor 
involvement. 
 
4.3. A case study of fish in Senegal 
 
4.3.1 Development of the industry 
 
Senegal is positioned in the South-Eastern corner of the African continent. It had an 
estimated 10.1 million inhabitants in 2003 and a GDP per capita of US$ 550 per 
capita
12. It is classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC) and Senegal participates 
in the second wave of the Integrated Framework (IF). A Diagnostic Trade Integration 
Study was completed in November 2002 as part of the IF
13 and a national workshop 
took place in the following month. An action plan was prepared on the basis of the 
workshop which was finally approved by the Cabinet in April 2003. Subsequently the 
government organised a Round Table meeting with potential donors in June the same 
year and in 2004, an Accelerated Growth Strategy is being prepared focusing on five 
sectors in which the main findings of the Diagnostic Trade Integration Survey are 
incorporated. The World Bank has already initiated various TRDA activities including 
                                                 
12 Factual information on Senegal is mainly collected at the World Bank’s country website for Senegal: 
http://www.worldbank.org/senegal. 
13 See Integrated Framework (2003) for the main report. Sector reports may be found at 
http://www.integratedframework.org/countries/senegal.htm.   21
an Integrated Marine and Coastal Resource Management project
14, which is based on 
the findings of Senegal’s Integrated Framework exercise. 
 
Improving Senegal’s export performance will require the diversification of its exports 
into products that face potentially strong demand in world markets. A natural candidate 
in this regard is fishery products given the coastal location of the country, it’s long 
tradition of fishing, it’s already established presence in shrimp and lobster markets and 
the promising demand trends for fishery products at the global scale in general and in 
the EU in particular as the EU is the main trading partner and main donor of Senegal 
(Integrated Framework 2002). 
 
The Senegalese fish stocks can be roughly divided into four types: Coastal bottom, 
coastal pelagic, deep-sea bottom and deep-sea pelagic which are mainly tuna. There are 
two very different types of fishermen to exploit the stocks. Industrial fishing dominates 
deep-sea pelagic while artisanal fishermen almost exclusively exploit coastal pelagic 
mainly sardines which are processed traditionally (smoking, salting) for local and 
regional markets. The two types of fishermen clash mainly in the pursuit of coastal 
bottom-dwelling fish such as grouper, yellowfin, mullet and sole which attract the most 
lucrative prices mainly sold in Europe as fresh fish. There are also conflicts within 
industrial fishing itself notably between foreign-owned and Senegalese vessels. 
Artisanal fishing is done from mainly motorised wooden pirogues which number over 
80,000 and are responsible for about 80 per cent of total catches and 60 per cent of 
exports (Golub and Mbaye 2002). 
 
Unfortunately, the fishing sector is in deep crises due to a number of factors including 
(i) the smallness of the fishery zones compared with the importance of the activity and 
the increasing scarcity of the resource, which accentuates the pressure and excerbates 
the conflicts; (ii) the obsolescence of the fishing vessels and of the national fishing 
fleet; (iii) the inadequacy of the basic infrastructure in the fishery centers (landing 
areas, means for preserving and transporting the products, etc.); (vi) the low level of 
added value and of productivity; (vii) the fact that certain products are not competitive 
in the international market, and (viii) the unsuitability of the financing systems of non-
industrial and industrial fishery activities. 
 
In addition to the sector specific constraints, Senegal suffers from a number of more 
general domestic constraints to exports. These include access to financing and the high 
costs of financing, administrative barriers to the creation and operation of firms, lack of 




The fishing sector is already responsible for the bulk of export earnings with an 
estimated 38% of total exports in the year of 2000. The sector is particularly important 
regarding poverty eradication as it serves as a measure of last resort for former 
agricultural workers who find employment there. The export value of the fishing sector 
                                                 
14 This activity has been funded by Japan but is still not operational, see 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/RMC/PHRD/proc%20planning.nsf/0/72c9b33e35e1202c85256e0b00799
259?OpenDocument. 
15 Republic of Senegal (2002).   22
is even greater than what it appears to be judging from export statistics as it is the 
source of an export of fishing rights. Agreements with other countries allow for foreign 
trawlers to opeate in Senegal's exclusive economic zone. Agreements have been made 
with the EU, Japan and neighbouring West African countries. The EU agreement is by 
far the most important one. The current agreement was concluded in June 2002 and 
covers the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2006
16. It gives fishing rights to 78 tuna 
fishing vessels (51 Spanish, 24 French and 3 Portuguese) and it sets quotas for the catch 
of demersal fish. These quotas are 30 per cent lower in comparison with the preceeding 
agreement. Coastal pelagic species are excluded as they are reserved for artisanal 
fishing. In return, Senegal will receive a sum of € 16 million annually, an increase over 
the € 12 million from the previous agreement. In addition, European ship owners 
holding licenses for fishing in Senegalese waters pay royalities (WTO 2003b). In 
principle, the income from the export of fishing rights should be shared between the 
treasury and the local fishing industry, but whether or not this takes place is very 
uncertain (Golub and Mbaye 2002). It is estimated that Senegal in total receives around 
US$ 20 million in payment for its sale of fishing rights (World Bank 2004). 
 
The fishing sector faces three immenent problems. First, the Doha round may lead to 
preference erosion. Second, EU food safety standards are putting pressure on the 
industry to upgrade hygiene standards and other food safety-related measures, and 
finally, parts of the Senegalese fishery is broadly viewed as being unsustainable. 
 
Senegal is classified as an LDC and furthermore benefits from the EU's Cotonou 
agreement. These trade preferences are particularly important for the tuna fishery as 
international competitions from East Asia, notably Thailand, is intense here. Tuna is 
mainly used in canning operations. Senegalese canned tune mainly goes to the EU. The 
EU has a quota on non-ACP tuna and a tariff of 24 percent on these from which 
Senegal is excempt. These preferences are critical as studies show that Senegalese tuna 
cannot compete with Thai tuna on a free world market (Golub and Mbaye 2002)
17. As a 
matter of fact, Senegal do not export tuna to the US as the country does not enjoy 
preferences here. If the Doha round erodes the preferences that Senegal enjoy, the three 
remaining Senegalese canneries will come under very severe cost pressure. 
 
Export from third countries to the EU are subject to EU food safety standards. Third 
countries are required to implement food safety systems which are equivalent in 
stringency to EU ones. Whether this is the case or not is determined by the Commission 
acting upon information from the EU's Food and Veterinary Office that regularly 
inspects food safety systems of third countries
18. The EU food safety system for fishery 
products has been tightened very significantly during the 1990s. As a result of French 
development assistance and the efforts of the Senegalese industry itself, the country 
appears on the so-called List I of countries to export to the EU. This is the highest 
                                                 
16 The previous agreement expired on April 2001 and was only renewed after a long period of tough 
negotiations which led to the exclusion of EU vessels from Senegalese waters for a little over a year. The 
first agreement dates from 1979. 
17 In 1998, the Caisse Française de Développement estimated that Senegal's unit cost of production of a 
can of tuna were 25 per cent higher than in Thailand and 10 per cent higher than in Côte d'Ivoire (cited in 
Golub and Mbaye 2002). 
18 The inspection reports of the Food and Veterinary Office may be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/inspections/index_en.html.   23




Fish stock management is generally viewed to be critical in Senegal (Golub and Mbaye 
2002; Republic of Senegal 2002). The Diagnostic Trade Integration Study for Senegal 
depicts the grave situation of the fishing sector as such: 
 
“The main issue with respect to this sector is the incipient crisis it is facing with 
respect to the depletion of fish stocks which, if not soon corrected, could lead to 
the collapse of a large part of this export-oriented industry in the next couple of 
years. The root cause of the crisis is the absence of regulations over fishing in a 
situation where the capacity to fish exceeds the availability of resources. 
 
Reforms of the sector would need to focus on allocation of future catches. 
Specifically, the strategy would need to ensure regeneration of fish stocks, and 
determine their allocation between local industrial trawlers, foreign trawlers and 
the artisanal fleet. Such an allocation would need to take into account the impact 
of each group on fish resources (notably juveniles), the relative economics of 
each type of operation, employment concerns, value-added generated, and the 
demands of the world market and the local processing industry. 
 
Senegal could benefit from the experience of other countries which are heavily 
dependent on fishery resources and which have faced similar problems and 
successfully tackled them. The solution would need to entail having the public 
sector assume an effective fisheries resource management plan that: (i) does not 
allow free and unlimited access to fisheries resources; (ii) reduces fishing efforts; 
and (iii) compensates those who are denied access to the resources. The 
application of such principles in Senegal will require that: (i) sector issues are 
brought to the top of the policy agenda; and (ii) the roles of both the private and 
public sectors are taken into account in the drafting of a coherent development 
program for the sector. Detailed measures are found in the Action Plan” 
(Republic of Senegal (2002), p. vi). 
 
4.3.2 TRDA activities 
 
  Upgrading of quality in the Senegalese fishing sector 
The French development agency supported the upgrading of the fishing sector to meet 
EU food safety standards through two successive projects running in the period from 
1993 to 1999. First, a fish quality programme worth French Francs 3 million was 
implemented. The project targetted the upgrading of the Senegalese public quality 
                                                 
19 The technicalities of the EU import regime are quite complex. There are three lists on which potential 
importers may appear. List I countries are allowed to export to the EU without conditions. Senegal is on 
list I. List II countries are only allowed to export under various additional restriction in addition to the 
ones laid down in the general regulatory framework. List III countries are generally not allowed to export 
although singe establishment may be allowed under special circumstances and subject to special controls. 
A country may only be up-graded from one list to the other after inspections of the EU’s Food and 
Veterinary Office. The basic legislation is Council Directives 91/493/EEC and 91/492/EEC on fishery 
products and shellfish respectively that lay dowm the required sanitary conditions and procedures to be 
followed by both EU and third countries in order to put products on the EU market.   24
control system, two laboratories and the education of people employed in the fishing 
industry and the public quality control system. Second, the restructuring of the fishing 
sector was supported by assisting around 30 enterprises and by developing a fish 
resource monitoring system for tuna and for caphalopods (squid, cuttlefish and 
octopus). 
 
The French assistance is a major reason behind Senegal's success in getting List I 
allowing it to export to the EU at the lowest possible food safety compliance costs. 
Reports from the EU's veterinary office monitoring third countries' fish exports to the 
EU, still complain about some remaining problems, but none of them serious enough to 
remove Senegal from List I (FVO 1999). The investments made to live up to the EU's 
hygiene standards have been very large and it is estimated that around 30 per cent were 
paid through the French foreign assistance (Golub and Mbaye 2002). Nevertheless, the 
whole experiences was a costly endeavor for the industry with many firms unable to 
accomodate the new rules and subsequently going bankrupt. The artisanal fishing 
industry still experiences difficulties with EU hygiene standards although current 
malpractices are presumably tolerated by the EU authorities. Deficiencies include 
unloading of catches directly on beaches outside approved landing sites. Such beaches 
may be used as garbage dumps (Golub and Mbaye 2002). 
 
Future changes in either the enforcement of current EU rules or of the regulations 
themselves may prove very difficult notably for the artisanal fishermen. It is presently 
unclear how the artisanal sector would fare under strict inforcement of hygiene rules. 
Future changes of EU regulations are very likely to include the introduction of 
traceability. This could include demands for knowing the origin of catches down to the 
individual boat in addition to basic information of how the fish has been caught and 
treated after the catch. Given the structure of the artisanal sector comprising of 80,000 
pirogues often occupied by illiterate fishermen this would create a mountain to climp 
for the Senegalese fishing industry. 
 
  Integrated Marine and Coastal Resource Management project 
The analytical work undertaken within the Integrated Framework on Senegal identified 
fishery management as a key issue. The World Bank Board approved a new project 
entitled the ‘Integrated Marine and Coastal Resource Management project’ on 11 
November 2004. The costs of the project will be shared between the International 
Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank (US$ 10 million), the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) (US$ 5 million) and the Government of Senegal (US$ 
1.49 million). The project is expected to become operational in February 2005 and to 
run over the following five years. 
 
A scientific conference in 2002 concluded that the Senegalese fishing industry is in 
crisis due to overfishing. The fish stocks affected are mainly of the coastal demersal 
type including species like groupers, breams, shrimp, octopus and cuttlefish which 
account for the bulk of exports. While data on total catches are notoriously unreliable in 
Senegal, it is believed that there has been a 50 percent drop in catches of coastal 
demersal species between 1997 and 2002. This development spilled over into an 
estimated fall in total value added from the industrial fleet of 37 percent and of 42 
percent for the artisanal fishermen (World Bank 2004). While overfishing is the major   25
reason for the crisis it is not the only one. Many crtical habitats such as breeding and 
nursery grounds are threatened by industrial pollution and rice agriculture extending 
into critical mangrove forest areas. 
 
Senegal has no fish resource management system to match fish catches with available 
resources. As innovations in fish transportation systems and increased international 
demand stimulated a hunt for high value demersal species as from the 1980s, 
overcapacity has developed in both the industrial and the artisanal sectors. Part of this 
development is a result of Senegalese developments and another part is a spill-over of 
the fish resource management problems in the EU which have send Spanish, French 
and Portuguese boats searching for fish outside EU waters under the cover of fishery 
agreements. 
 
The difficulties in fish resource management are political, institutional, technological 
and financial. It has proven very difficult to resist pressure from fishing communities as 
well as the industrial fleet to maintain open access to the fishing grounds, and at the 
same time the local institutions and the Ministry of Fishery have been poorly equipped 
to undertake the task. Technological capacity to estimate and monitor fish stocks is 
poor and the government has furthermore been forced to place a high value on the 
payments for the sale of fishing rights to other countries notably the EU. 
 
The project first and foremost targets the management of the artisanal fishery. It will 
develop an area-based co-management system in three pilot areas of major importance 
namely the Senegalese river delta, the Cap-Vert Peninsula and the Saloum River delta. 
In such a system, local fishermen will share both the power to make decisions regarding 
geographically located fish stocks and the accountability with the government. The 
system will thereby lead to both a decentralisation of fish management to the level 
where the interests of good management are the highest and to the end of open access 
to the fishing ground including restrictions on artisanal fishing. Other elements of fish 
management policy that may be introduced locally or nationally includes a fundamental 
restructuring of the Fishery Ministry, restrictions in industrial fisherments operations 
and capacity, imposition of biological rest areas, periods to allow fish stocks to re-build 
and the establishment of a Fisheries Trust Fund to compensate excluded fishermen and 
develop alternative livelihoods (World Bank 2004). 
 
The project has a twin objective of maintaining biodiversity in addition to the 
management of artisanal fishing. It also aims at the protection of critical habitats and 
ecosystems upon which fisheries depend through strengthening or creating biosphere 
reserves. The project is not a stand-alone activity. Other donor activities in the fishing 
sector touching upon fish management includes a project under preparation by the FAO 
and the African Development Bank as well as ongoing projects from the EU, the 






                                                 
20 On these activities, see World Bank (2004), p. 14 and additional annex 13.   26
5. Conclusion 
 
TRDA is a new concept in trade negotiations but old in a development context. A 
substantial part has so far went to issues directly linked with trade agreements notably 
the build-up of negotiation capacity and the implementation of agreements. A shift is 
however occuring towards the incorporation of trade capacity building as well. In an 
African context, trade capacity building is equivalent to addressing the numerous 
supply constraints that the continent faces and which may be of a structural og political 
nature. High-profile initiatives in this regard include the Integrated Framework and the 
Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme as well as the development of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. As evidenced by the three case studies, there are 
very significant initiatives on-going outside these high profile initiatives by bi- and 
multilateral donors and NGOs that have a direct bearing on export capacity. 
 
The expansion of trade capacity activities is a welcome development that may lead to a 
merger of trade and development interests in TRDA. Currently, there are big 
differences between how TRDA is viewed and discussed by trade negotiators on one 
side and by development practitioners on the other. Expanding the trade agenda to 
include supply capacity is welcome but we must keep the right perspective. It is as 
difficult to argue against increasing TRDA levels through trade negotiations as it is 
easy to over-emphasise the potential that TRDA has to smoothen trade negotiations. 
The trade and development agendas are natural partners but the marriage is bound to be 
troubled. The three case studies illuminate why this is so. 
 
First, let us take one step back. TRDA is constituted by two elements of which only one 
is studied in the case studies. Technical assistance to negotiation capacity building and 
trade agreement implementation is very general and it is hard to see how such 
assistance affects individual sectors. Nevertheless, two words of caution are warranted 
about how much good can be expected from these activities for African export 
industries. No doubt African trade negotiators are not as good and many as 
industrialised country ones. Nevertheless, African negotiation capacity is not the main 
reason why gains from multilateral trade talks are few. Two other reasons should be the 
key suspects. First, WTO talks is about horsetrading. Africa has few horses in the stable 
and it is this simple fact determined by the tiny sizes of African economies as compared 
with OECD ones, that is responsible for the poor leverage in negotiations rather than 
the number of the African negotiators and their skills to ride their horses. Second, 
African supply capacity is low and severely constraints the potential of the continent to 
exploit opening markets. More about this when the lessons from the case studies are 
discussed below. The second type of activity of which the value is doubtful is the 
assistance to ease implementation of trade agreements. Many of these trade agreements 
are of little importance to Africa. Low capacity to exploit new markets is one reason. 
Another is the fact that many WTO agreements actually regulate domestic policies that 
may affect trade rather than trade policies themselves and Africa has little interest in 
regulating TRIPS, SPS, TBT and other issues the way laid down in the WTO 
agreements which merely reflect developed country concerns. 
 
So the major positive effects from TRDA should be expected from trade capacity 
building. The three case studies identify a number of supply constraints. In the Kenyan   27
case, malfunctioning input systems (agro-chemicals and credit), quality management, 
and rising transport costs and the intensification of competion from newcomers to 
world markets are key. Underlying these difficulties are the smallholder agrarian 
structure and existence of information asymmetries at the point of exchange in the 
supply chain. These have been accentuated by the rise of food safety standards that 
makes it impossible to measure the quality of the product exchanged (the parameters of 
documentation and pesticide residues) and so leading to increased demands for 
monitoring and farmer education. The Ghanian problems are to a large extent similar 
although land access problems figure more prominently especially for the creation of 
large farms which is much easier in Kenya than in Ghana. The Senegalese fishing 
industry faces a number of challenges of which the two most important ones are 
compliance with ever stricter EU food safety standards and fish stock management. In 
all three cases, poor public capacity to set and enforce food safety standards is a 
dominant characteristic. 
 
All three case studies are export success stories. In other words, in all three cases 
supply capacity problems have been frequent but surmountable so far. International 
market demand and private capacity rather than donor and NGO TRDA efforts have 
been responsible for this. There is one exception. The Senegalese fishing industry has 
greatly benefitted from French assistance to overcome food safety related market 
barriers. It is no small feat to be listed as a List I country in the EU. Things may change 
in the future. The Kenyan fresh produce and the Ghanian pineapple sectors have chosen 
different paths to adjust to food safety standards. In Kenya, smallholders have been 
marginalised and production have moved to large-scale commercial growers often 
vertically integrated with exporters. In Ghana, low standard markets have been the 
main target and the smallholders have remained in the supply chain although as residual 
suppliers. Many donor efforts have attempted to improve the position of the 
smallholders in both countries. While there are some signs of success in individual 
cases (e.g. Blue Skies in Ghana) it is not possible to conclude that TRDA has generally 
been able to reverse the trend. The cost implications of food safety standards on 
smallholders vs. large farmers have not been worked out completely. There is some 
scanty evidence that it is more costly to comply for small than for large farmers due to 
higher investment costs initially and higher monitoring costs permanently. The success 
of TRDA will depend on whether this pattern is true and if it is, whether it can be 
changed. There is a risk that TRDA targetting smallholder groups and similar attempts 
to link the farmers with exports only serves as a subsidy to offset permanently higher 
costs. In that case, the smallholder-based sourcing systems will break down the moment 
the donors go home. In Kenya, there are reasons to suspect that that is going on. In fact, 
large companies like Homegrown, a company set up in the 1980s specifically for the 
supermarket trade, have been the main agents responsible for keeping some of the 
smaller guys linked up with export markets rather than TRDA efforts. 
 
The mixed history of TRDA in the three case studies is evidence to the fact that supply 
constraints have a multi-faceted nature. Some are relatively simple to solve although 
potentially costly to finance such as the creation of laboratories to monitor fish hygiene 
in Senegal. Others are deeply rooted in African economic and political structures. A 
prominent example present in all three cases is the atomistic supply structure and the 
length of supply chains. The Kenayan and Ghanian smallholders and the Senegalese   28
artisanal fishermen are simply much more costly to link up with export markets than 
their larger scale collegues often found outside African countries. TRDA will have 
great difficulties changing this fact in the foreseable future. 
 
This turns us back to the troubled marriage of the trade and development agendas. 
TRDA in the trade agenda is seen as tool that may enable Africa to finally benefit from 
WTO sponsored market openings. The development agenda shows that we should be 
careful of expecting too much. Trade capacity development is not some new tool 
invented on the spot around the negotiation table in Geneva. It is a tried and tested, 
sometimes failed sometimes succeeded, tool in the development practitioner’s toolbox. 
Many of the supply capacity problems Africa face are deep structural and political ones 
on which TRDA has little influence. The trade agenda also sees TRDA as a way of 
compensating African countries that might loose on specific issues such as preference 
erosion and rising food import bills in the case a country is a net food importer. The 
case studies show that TRDA may be a poor policy instrument here. The positive 
effects of TRDA are often uncertain and when successful, slow to materialise. Other 
ways of compensating loosers such as safety nets or, even better, crafting better rules in 
the first place, are more obvious tools. 
 
Nevertheless, the trade and development agendas will have to stick it out together no 
matter the troubles they are going through.  
 
The discussion of the usefulness of TRDA in Africa much depend on one’s perspective. 
If it is used in a trade negotiation context to turn losses into benefits or as a 
compensatory mechanism, it is problematic. In that perspective, it quickly becomes a 
bad excuse for neglecting issues that should be addressed by negotiating better trade 
rules than away from the negotiation table in the development department. If it is used 
in its own right, it should be welcomed with open arms. Actually, it may be best seen as 
a necessecity although still only a piece in a puzzle in which domestic policy action is 
equally if not more important. Positive results do not lure just around the corner but 
may take time to materialise and failures will occur as always with development 
assistance. But, by the end of the day, there is a lot of potential in Africa. It is just not 
easy to set up sustainable trade but it can be done. 
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